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ACTION AF-00

INFO	LOG-00	NP-00	CIAE-00	INL-00	DODE-00	DS-00	EAP-00
	VC-00	H-00	TEDE-00	INR-00	L-00	VCE-00	AC-00
	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIG-00	OMB-00	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00
	ACE-00	P-00	FMPC-00	SP-00	SSO-00	SS-00	TRSE-00
	T-00	IIP-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-00	DRL-00	G-00
	SAS-00	/000W					

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FM AMEMBASSY ACCRA  
TO AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY MONROVIA IMMEDIATE  
SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6610  
INFO ECOWAS COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L ACCRA 001560

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/15/2014

TAGS: [PREL GH ECOWAS](#)

SUBJECT: CHAMBAS ON ACCRA III, LIBERIA, SUDAN

REF: STATE 162865

Classified By: Polchief Richard Kaminski, reason 1.5 (B/D).

1. (C) Summary. According to ECOWAS Executive Secretary Ibn Chambas, the Accra III talks will focus on four main points: return of dismissed ministers, resumption of the government of "national unity", passage of LMA legislation, and DDR. Legislation will be the most difficult issue, with Article 35 delineation of presidential eligibility at the heart of deliberations -- some "transitional" formula must be found to avoid a referendum on changing the constitutional provision, he said. The Liberia meeting will bring LURD, MODEL and former GOL officials to speak with Presidents Obasanjo and Kufuor, and, if possible, Kofi Annan. Interim Chairman Gyude Bryant will be urged to consult more widely, and the three factions will be pressured to cease their infighting and allow completion of DDR. Any talks on Sudan will happen on the margins of these two ECOWAS-sanctioned meetings, and will likely involve only Annan, Obasanjo, AU Commission Chairman Konare, and perhaps Kufuor. Chambas appeared optimistic that acceptable formulae would be found to reinvigorate the LMA process. End summary.

2. (C) Polchief met with ECOWAS Executive Secretary Ibn Chambas July 28. Chambas said four main issues faced the Accra III participants: return of dismissed ministers, resumption of the government of national reconciliation, passage of legislation required by LMA, and commencement of DDR. Chambas was confident that acceptable formulations, already under discussion in Accra, would be found regarding the dismissed ministers: Bedie would be empowered to appoint a new minister, as would be the New Forces, with other acceptable positions found for the dismissed officials (including Soro). Once these formulations were agreed upon, return of the G-7 to the government and its resumption of duties as a true unity government would follow. DDR would be easier to begin once the government had resumed its functioning with G7 participation.

3. (C) The heart of the discussions, said Chambas, would be LMA legislation and its intersection with the Ivorian constitution, most importantly, the constitutional stipulation under Article 35 that both parents of presidential candidates be Ivorian. Chambas was adamant that a referendum on article 35 be avoided. The enormous difficulty in holding a valid referendum in such a divided society, together with the very real potential for a "No" vote on changing the constitution, meant some form of "transitional arrangement" had to be found which would effectively trump Article 35. Chambas said he had been suggesting that all signatories to LMA who were heads of political parties be accepted as presidential candidates. Another formulation would be "all former prime ministers." Chambas had discussed the issue with GOCI officials in Accra, and they had expressed great interest. However, President Gbagbo had been "holding firm" on the requirement for a referendum in meetings around the region. Gbagbo had to "give" on this issue for Accra III to be a success, said Chambas.

4. (C) On Liberia, Chambas said that Chairman Gyude Bryant, LURD leaders Kabinah Janneh, George Dweh and Sekou Konneh, former GOL Vice President (and briefly President) Moses Blah, and MODEL leaders would meet with Obasanjo, Kufuor, and "possibly" Annan, if the UNSG's schedule permitted. As Obasanjo would leave Accra the morning of July 30, this session had to occur either late on July 29 or early the next day. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement would in no way be up

for amendment or re-negotiation. urther, ECOWAS wanted to urge Bryant to consult mre effectively and systematically (his handling of the central bank goveror's departure was a cae in point of poor consultation). The various facions would be strongly counseled to cease their factional struggles (and identities), and allow DDR to commence throughout the country.

15. (C) Chambas theorized that any discussions of the crisis in Sudan (reftel) would occur informally on the margins of the Ivorien and Liberian discussions, with Obasanjo and Annan taking the opportunity to compare notes. Sudan was not on the formal ECOWAS agenda for the two sets of talks.

16. (C) The Ivorien talks would open July 29 with a brief plenary session of all the heads of states and Ivorien parties, he said, and then break for intensive "one-on-one" sessions. He hoped that agreement would be reached "toward the end of the day" on essential points. The Liberian session would probably begin immediately upon conclusion of the Accra III talks.

17. (C) Comment. Chambas appeared moderately upbeat, encouraged that the various Ivorien parties had shown

flexibility in recent days, but mindful of how far short of expectations the Linas-Marcoussis Accords had fallen. End comment.

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